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Policymaking according to
High School Civics
• Legislative branch makes laws
• Executive branch carries them out
• Judicial branch interprets them, decides
controversies
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Mysteries of High School Civics Model
• Is bureaucracy directly under President, or
independent 4th branch?
• When executive branch goes to carry out law, how
does it know its meaning?
• Why are there controversies requiring judicial
resolution?
• Why isn’t all
real action in
Congress?

The Anti-High School Civics Model
• Laws are just bunches of words that the
executive and judiciary branches have to make
something of
• The world is very complicated and doesn’t
neatly match words
• Laws are often vague and indeterminate, both
unintentionally and intentionally

Does the U.S. have
a climate change policy?
• In terms of high school civics model: barely

– National Climate Program Act of 1978
– Global Climate Protection Act of 1987
– Bush 41 signed, and Senate ratified, 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, a nonbinding agreement to mitigate
– But Senate rejects Kyoto Protocol negotiated by
Clinton administration; no binding regulation
– Lots of bills in late 1990s, early 2000s, but no laws
– Cap and Trade bill sought during unified
Democratic control of Congress defeated

Does the U.S. have
a climate change policy?
• In reality: yes, a strange and patchy one
– Pursued outside of Congress by states
– Federal greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations derived
through judicial and executive reinterpretations of
existing law, the Clean Air Act (CAA)

Brief History of Clean Air Act
• First passed in 1970, amended 1977
– § 108 requires Administrator to regulate “each air
pollutant–[…] emissions of which, in his judgment,
cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare”
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Key Definitions
• § 302(g) defines “air pollutant”:
– “The term ‘air pollutant’ means any air pollution
agent or combination of such agents, including
any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive …
substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air.”

• § 302(h) defines “welfare”:
– Includes effects on weather and climate

Difficulties in Applying CAA to GHGs
• CAA designed to address localized pollution
problems, force states to improve air quality
until prescribed standards attained
• 1990 Amendments added emissions trading
program to combat acid rain, implementation
of Montreal Protocol to protect stratospheric
ozone layer, but doesn’t include anything
addressing climate change

Turning the CAA on Greenhouse Gases
• Environmentalists frustrated with lack of
congressional progress petition EPA to use
Clean Air Act in 1999, arguing that climate
change is damaging and therefore covered
• Clinton leaves office without action; finally,
EPA rejects petition in 2003, saying it will wait
and see
• Environmentalists (joined by states) turn to
litigation

Massachusetts v. EPA
• D.C. Circuit rules EPA has discretion, and its
reasonable interpretation due deference (2005)
• Supreme Court splits 5-4 (2007), with majority
ruling that CAA unambiguously requires EPA to
make a determination (and essentially requiring
regulation of GHGs)
• Dissents argue that alleged harms did not merit
standing, and that on merits EPA’s
interpretation a reasonable one

Frisbees and flatulence?

Difficulties in Applying CAA to GHGs
• Once GHGs defined as pollutant for one part, not
clear how all of CAA’s many parts won’t apply
• Permitting requirements: § 111 for all new
industrial sources; § 165 for ~40,000 sources;
and Title V for ~6 million sources (!)
• Local actions not capable of directly improving
local conditions or “attaining” any standard

EPA Regulations under CAA
• Advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (2008)
• Endangerment finding, triggering many
requirements in statute (12/09)
• Stricter “tailpipe” emissions standards for cars, by
modifying CAFE standards (5/10)
• Energy efficiency requirements for new power
plants, which would effectively prevent
construction of new coal plants (proposed 3/12)
• Most potentially problematic, controversial
applications currently in legal limbo, probably
leading to more litigation

What of Changes in the Law?
• Main reaction after Massachusetts v. EPA
handed down was that Congress would be
forced into action, one way or the other, by
inefficient use of statute
• Did create pressure as cap-and-trade bill
sought in 2009, but coalition fractured
• Nearly six years later, still waiting… Why?

EPA Tailoring and Timing:
Policy against Law
• EPA issues “Timing Rule” and “Tailoring Rule”
saying that it will depart from CAA
requirements in some respects:
– Will delay creation of permitting process
– Will change applicability thresholds
– Justified on grounds of administrative necessity,
need to avoid absurdity, and EPA’s ability to

If policies don’t come from laws, how
can lawmakers be convinced to act?
• Petitioners challenging EPA regulations say
that by ignoring the law, the agency destroys
motivation for Congress to fix it
• D.C. Circuit rejects this
argument, citing Schoolhouse
Rock to say that harm is
entirely speculative

Well, that’s what happens when you
have a dysfunctional Congress

Coping with a dysfunctional Congress…
by cutting it out of the loop?
• As naïve and optimistic as high school civics
model was about Congress, story of GHG
regulation as it stands today goes to opposite
extreme
• Executive prerogative: bureaucrats do the best
they can with legislative tools they have,
rather than being first and foremost agents
carrying out congressional will

Other Policy Areas where
Executive Creativity Leads
• No Child Left Behind

– Law’s requirements (designed to become increasingly
strict) often waived by agreements between Secretary
of Education and states

• BP Oil Spill

– Negotiated huge settlement and distributed funds
– Instituted drilling moratorium

• Immigration Reform

– DREAM Act goals effectively pursued through changes
in enforcement policy

Hyperventilating Generalizations
• Are we in a new era of administrative
government, in which policy is generated of its
own accord?
• Whither democracy?
• Whither the rule of law?

Can it work?
• How far can existing laws really go in solving
problems?
• Do inefficiencies of jerry-rigged regime
discredit regulatory objectives?
• Will there be a revenge of the voters?
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